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The coarse, which is intended for seed, must stand till the bolls are sharp pointed, the stalks fully ripe, and managed as before-mentioned."

We hope to give in our next Number some extracts from Doctor Stephenson's Observations on Bleaching, and to accompany them with a few remarks, the result of experience. R.

The Speech of Henry Brougham, esq. before the House of Commons, Friday, April 1, 1808, in support of the Petitions from London, Liverpool, and Manchester, against the Orders in Council. Taken in Short-hand by Mr. A. Frazer. London, printed by J. M'Creery, for J. Ridgway, Piccadilly, 1808. p.p. 84.

THE subject of the restrictions on trade, occasioned by the Orders in Council affecting us in this corner of the empire, as well as in other places, in our vital commercial interests, we had designed to bring this subject before our readers at an earlier period, but the copy of this work which had been received, was mislaid, and we were necessitated to wait to receive another copy. It is not yet however too late, for unhappily these impolitic restrictions still remain, and notwithstanding the delusive accounts published by ministers and their adherents, to deceive the public, and catch at a momentary popularity, it is very probable that no relaxation will take place in the American regulations, so as to afford us any substantial relief, until Great Britain relax in her arrogant claims, and rescind her orders in council.

Remote from the immediate scene of commercial politics, we are sometimes, as in the modes of dress, a year behind in the fashion. Last year the orders in council occupied the attention of the British merchants; the merchants of London, Liverpool, and Manchester, petitioned against them, and prayed to be heard by themselves or counsel at the bar of the house of commons; their request was granted, and they were permitted to adduce a mass of important evidence, and their counsel, on summing it up, made the speech which is the subject of review.

While this business was going forward, our merchants remained uninterested and aloof, and because they did

not immediately feel its effects, but in the mean time were rather aided by it in their avidity of speculation, they felt no concern in the affair—but speculation is often short-sighted, and it is probable they may yet feel the dire effects of this commercial warfare, of which the British orders form the most effective cause.

Already the people, if not the merchants, have been aroused from this state of apathy by the want of the usual supply of flaxseed, and our commercial interests are affected by the high prices of cotton-wool, and other American produce. Tobacco, that comfort, and from habit, that necessary article to the poor, has become exorbitantly high, and though statesmen and rich capitalists may disregard such sufferings, as beneath their notice, yet thus the sum of human misery is increased.

"And sorrow felt, in cottages confin'd,
Sighs unregarded to the passing wind."

But if the criterion of a good government was justly estimated, as it ought to be, not by the emoluments to the rulers and their dependents, who participate of the plunder, but by the sum total of happiness to the people at large, different sentiments would prevail, and much relief would be experienced from the burthens of an overstrained taxation being removed, and from all injurious restrictions on trade and commerce being withdrawn, so as to give full scope to industry, and the consequent happiness of the community.

It is our design to give the history of the origin of these famous orders in council, and, in the first place, we present to our readers, the Petition from the Merchants, &c. of London, as giving a comprehensive view of the bad effects arising from the measure complained of:

"To the Honourable the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, in Parliament assembled, The Petition of the undersigned Merchants, Manufacturers, and others of the City of London, interested in the Trade with the United States of America.

"HUMBLY SHOWETH,

"THAT your Petitioners contemplate with the greatest anxiety and appre-

hension the alarming consequences with which they are threatened from certain orders in council purporting to be issued "for the protection of the trade and navigation of Great Britain," but on which they are induced, after mature consideration, to believe, that they must be productive of the most ruinous effects. Your Petitioners are duly sensible of the necessity of making every sacrifice of personal interest to promote the strength and resources of the country in the present extraordinary crisis of public affairs, and if the total change introduced into the whole commercial system of this country and of the world by the orders in council, could be conducive to so desirable an object, your Petitioners, great as their losses must be, would submit without a murmur—but understanding that these orders are principally, if not wholly, recommended by an opinion that they will prove beneficial to the commercial interests of this country, they feel it to be their duty humbly to represent their conviction, that this opinion is founded in error, and that if the prayer of their petition be granted, they shall be able to prove that they must be productive of the most fatal consequences to the interests, not only of your Petitioners, but of the commerce and manufactures of the empire at large.

"Your Petitioners will abstain from enforcing by any details their apprehension, that these measures are likely to interrupt our peace with the United States of America, our intercourse with which, at all times valuable, is infinitely more so since we are excluded from the continent of Europe. To this only remaining branch of our foreign intercourse, we must now look for a demand for our manufactures, for many of the most important materials for their support, and for supplies of provisions and naval stores necessary for our subsistence and defence. Your Petitioners feel assured, that they will be able to prove to the satisfaction of your honourable house, that the neutrality of America has been the means of circulating, to a large amount, articles of the produce and manufactures of this country, in the dominions of our numerous enemies, to which we have no direct access.

"That the annual value of British

manufactures exported to the United States of America, exceeds ten millions sterling, and,

"That, as our consumption of the produce of that country falls far short of that amount, the only means of paying us must arise from the consumption of the produce of America, in other countries, which the operation of the orders in council must interrupt, and in most instances totally destroy.

"That the people of America, even if they remain at peace with us, must, by a want of demand for their produce, and by the general distress our measures must occasion, be disabled from paying their debts to this country, which may fairly be estimated to amount to the enormous sum of twelve millions sterling.

"That the neutrality of America, so far from being injurious to the other commercial interests of Great Britain, has promoted materially their prosperity.

"That the produce of our Colonies in the West Indies, of our empire in the East, and of our fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, has frequently found a foreign market by this means, and,

"That, by the destruction of the neutrality of the only remaining neutral state, all possibility of intercourse with the rest of the world being removed, trade cannot possibly be benefited, but must necessarily be annihilated.

"Your Petitioners feeling, as they do most sensibly with their fellow-subjects, the pressure of a war in which their commerce has principally been aimed at by the enemy, would scorn to plead their distress in recommendation of measures inconsistent with the honour and substantial interests of their country; but they humbly rely upon the wisdom of the legislature, that this distress shall not be increased by our own errors, and they confidently believe, that if they are permitted to illustrate by evidence, the facts they here state, and to explain many others which they shall here refrain from enumerating, they cannot fail to establish the conviction with which they are so strongly impressed.

"That the orders in council are founded on the most mistaken opinions of the commercial interests of the empire, and must be particu-

larly fatal to those of your Petitioners.

"Your Petitioners therefore pray, that they may be heard by themselves or counsel, at the bar of this honourable house, and be permitted to produce evidence in support of the allegations of their Petition, or that this honourable house will examine into the nature and extent of their grievances, in any mode which may appear advisable, with a view of affording such relief as this honourable House in its wisdom may think proper.

"And your Petitioners will ever pray."

We now proceed, in the words of the speech, to lay before our readers a full detail of the rise of this measure. Speaking of his clients he says:

"The order of the 7th of January, 1807, was no light matter to them, either in its substantial effects or in the alarm which it created. Their apprehensions of its effects were great and serious indeed. But, confident that they could lose nothing in the estimation of their country, by delaying to urge any objection to it until they had first tried its operation, and experienced actual injury from it, they waited until, in common with others, they found that the inefficacy of that measure was one of its best recommendations. When these new orders in council were issued, it was their purpose to follow the same line of conduct; and after endeavouring to make themselves masters of the meaning of those decrees (an attempt which certainly demanded no trifling degree of attention, and occasioned a very considerable delay) it was much their wish to have found them as harmless as that of the 7th of January; but, although they are very far from flattering themselves that they yet understand the nature of those orders of November last, and although they can scarcely hope for the rare good fortune of ever attaining that knowledge, they are satisfied that they have discovered by the effects which they already have produced upon their own concerns, enough of their nature and import to feel that they are utterly ruinous to them.

"It will afford them much satis-

faction to reflect, that they have been the means of bringing before you so great a body of important information, for elucidating a subject as difficult as it is momentous, and to know that whatever fate may await their petition they have done their best to enter a lasting protest upon the journals of the country, against measures more dangerous to its prosperity than any that were ever before attempted. Plans of this sort, sir, are not in their nature long-lived; and after these orders shall be known no more, or only remembered in the ruinous effects they may have produced, the mass of evidence which the petitioners have piled up at your bar, will remain, not perhaps to deter pernicious schemers from again meddling with the commerce of the country, but surely to warn the country from listening to their councils.

"Sir, in proceeding to state the import of this body of evidence it is necessary that I should go back, in the first place, to the decrees of the French government which are stated to have given rise to the measures complained of; and between which and those measures there appears to be some dispute, as to the occasion of the calamities that have arisen.

"Late in the year 1806, Bonaparte, in a moment, it should seem, of elation unhappily by no means unnatural in his situation, thought of issuing a decree which might affect the trade and navigation of this country, as extensively as those other decrees which he had issued upon the Continent, and had executed by half a million of armed men. This decree was not then for the first time tried, nor was it accounted by him an experiment of a very novel description, although received in this country as something wholly new.—It had been repeatedly tried before, and had in every instance manifestly failed. Not to go back to the war of 1759, I may only observe that in the war of 1756, the principle was broadly laid down by the French government, that the seizure of any manufactures or produce of the British dominions should render the whole cargo among which they were to find, Pp

liable to confiscation. Towards the end of the American war a similar principle was partially attempted to be introduced: but of these I need not say much; for in the course of the Revolution-war two decrees similar to the former, though still more near the Berlin decree, were issued. Of these it may be necessary for me to mention the substance. The first of them was issued in 1796, and after a variety of other clauses, it subjects all ships carrying British goods to seizure and detention. We find not merely the detail of the Berlin decree introduced as to the goods, but also the provision requiring a *certificate of origin* (as this document has since been called) which was deemed a *sine qua non* for saving the ship and cargo from detention. A similar decree was issued in 1800, after Bonaparte's arrival in France. It was generally promulgated, and remains, as far as any such decrees can be, in force. In 1797 those belligerent principles were extended from the cargo to affect the ship; and I hold in my hand a decree issued by the council of Five Hundred, enacting that the characters of vessels shall be determined by their cargoes. In consequence of this enactment, every vessel loaded in whole or in part with English goods, was declared lawful prize. The second article declares that no foreign vessel, which in the course of her voyage shall have entered an English port, shall be permitted to enter any port in the French dominions.

"It is surely needless for me to prove that, although these orders were thus promulgated, they never were executed. I need not bring evidence to show that these commercial decrees were nugatory. After they were issued, the progress of our exports proceeded not merely increasing, but in a short period almost to double the amount of former times. It is notorious that France, in spite of all such prohibitions has been consuming daily more and more of the produce of this country, down to the period of the Berlin edict. But, however inefficacious these boasts may have proved, the enemy, it seems, determined once more to try their

effect. He resolved to have another decree at us and at our trade, expecting, perhaps, to frighten, if he could not hurt us. Accordingly, in the month of November, 1806, he issued that one which forms the pretext for our orders in council. This decree consists of three branches. It condemns all cargoes of British produce or manufacture; it threatens the seizure of all vessels going to or from England; and it shuts the ports of the enemy against all vessels which have last cleared out from British ports. It may be asked what chance was there that such a decree as this should succeed? Was it that France had determined suddenly to assemble all her fleets, and venture to send them to sea, which she had not dared to do before? Was it that she then intended to engage all our blockading and cruising squadrons, which till now, she never durst look in the face? Was it that she purposed in this manner to beat us out of the water, and destroy, as it were, our naval superiority? Or was it that without these preliminary steps, she was by her mere influence and great name upon the continent of Europe, to stop all vessels sailing upon the sea to or from England, to seize every article of our produce which could be found floating on the ocean, to do that which we, even we, with all our naval superiority, are not able to effect? Surely if France had not the power to execute her design in some of these ways, it might have been calmly regarded as a mere empty menace; nay, a stale one too. We might really have hoped, that so vapid and spiritless a boast would not again have taken in those who had been so often before duped into a vain alarm by it. Nevertheless it should seem that the enemy knew us better, for we no sooner heard of it than we fell into our old error of supposing, that, because it was a French manifesto regularly drawn up, and enforced by Bonaparte's power on shore (where it might produce some effect) therefore it was also to have similar effects by sea.

"Sir, until our orders in council were issued, it appears clearly, without any reasoning, to any one who

looks at the subject, that there was no possibility whatever of Bonaparte putting his threats into execution.— But in order to show this more evidently than could possibly be effected by any arguments; we have brought witnesses to your bar, merchants engaged in trade with the Continent who have been able to state distinctly by dates, names, and circumstances, the manner in which those decrees operated.

“In page 55 of the printed evidence, Mr. White an insurance-broker of the city of London, in answer to a question, whether he had occasion to charter any vessels direct to the continent, after the Berlin decree, states to this house, that he did himself charter two American vessels for Amsterdam, the one in the month of January, and the other in March, 1807, which both arrived safe. From this it appears therefore that four months after the Berlin decree, two vessels were chartered to the continent, and landed and sold their cargoes in safety at Amsterdam. He says that these vessels were chiefly laden with cotton, produced by America, and the West-Indies: he knew of their being discharged and that “the ships were paid for their labour,” and adds that he was paid his commission as ship and insurance-broker. In short, these voyages were performed safely from one end to the other. In the next page the same witness mentions, first, that American vessels prior to last November used to clear out regularly from this country to the continent, and there land their cargoes; and secondly, that a considerable quantity of West-India produce had been taken over in American vessels, subsequent to the Berlin decree in November, 1806. The same witness mentions other instances of voyages having been performed since that decree, and some in which the cargoes of the vessels had gone into the ports of Spain, in spite of the Spanish decree, issued in terms of the Berlin decree, and with cargoes of British East-India produce on board. On being asked whether any considerable branch of trade was carried on in this way, he distinctly adds that other brokers as well as himself had trans-

acted similar business, and that this sort of intercourse with the continent has been considerable.

“The evidence of Mr. Bell, whose distinct and full testimony must be in the recollection of this house, was very strong to the same points. He gives us two extracts from letters which he had received from his correspondents on the continent. On being asked if he had lately received letters from his correspondents in Holland, touching the execution of the commercial decrees in that country, he stated that he had received a letter from his friends in Rotterdam, dated the 7th of September, containing these words: “We are able to assure you the late decree does not affect Americans that may have called in England, provided they have not loaded in England, and that they declare the last port they came from.” The decree here alluded to was subsequent to the first Dutch edict, and was issued for the purpose of effecting a more rigorous execution of it. He was asked have you received any letters since from Holland?” To this he answered that he had one dated 22nd of September, from the same house saying, “We repeat, ships touching in England are received here as before.” Subsequent even to this date it appears that he received one. It was dated 29th of October, only a fortnight before our orders in council, and concluded by saying, “Prices meantime seem at their level without some new difficulty or broil, meaning, as Mr. Bell said, “if nothing new had occurred.” From this it is obvious that since the writer’s last letter, being the one just now quoted, no new execution of these decrees had been attempted, otherwise prices could never have kept at their former level.

“After mentioning a variety of cases, in which the merchants had been deceived in their expectations or belief of the execution of the French decree, by the temporary detention of neutral vessels, and afterwards been undeceived by the subsequent release of those vessels at first supposed to have been condemned, Mr. Glennie said that he knew of no one instance wherein the Berlin decree had been carried into

execution upon neutral vessels in France. It appears that this gentleman had various correspondents in various parts of the continent, who wrote to him, not merely touching his own commercial concerns, but also upon matters in which he was indirectly or eventually interested. They gave him the political news of the day so far as they themselves were in possession of it; and so far as it bore upon the interests of trade. And notwithstanding this extensive correspondence, he never had received any one notice of a condemnation, during the whole year that had elapsed between the Berlin and the English decrees. From Mr. Glennie's evidence then it appears that there was no intention in France to execute those edicts for this was a branch of them which she had it in her power to enforce.

"A decree had been issued in Holland, closing the Dutch ports and laying an embargo on their own trade for the better carrying those measures into execution—a measure framed in something of the spirit of our own orders. In allusion to this decree, Mr. Glennie's correspondent says on the 26th of February, 1808, that "the sole object of this letter is to inform you that all vessels arrived since the promulgation of the decrees mentioned in our foregoing, are now released, and even several which have been for many months detained in Flushing, on their way to Antwerp, have also got permission to proceed thither and discharge their cargoes."

"It thus appears, sir, by the evidence of some of the most respectable brokers and merchants of this country, that the Berlin decree was so little executed, that vessels under American colours cleared out to ports of the enemy's country in spite of that, and all the other decrees. But there is other evidence of a less direct nature substantiating this important proposition. I should mention first as to the indirect evidence of the non-execution of the Berlin decree, that remittances came over from the Continent to merchants in this country, some of them members of this house, during the year after that decree, in the same manner, and in at least as great abundance as at any former period. Mr.

Glennie said that he was accustomed to receive in former years half a million in remittances from the Continent; and being asked, not by me, but on his cross-examination, if he had experienced a defalcation subsequent to that Berlin decree, answered distinctly, that on the contrary, he had never before received so much by a hundred thousand pounds as during the year after the Berlin decree was promulgated. The other witnesses state the same thing.

"Mr. Glennie also stated to you in detail, the amount of the sums which he paid in different years for postages in the course of his extensive dealings as a merchant. In page 65, you have it in evidence that his whole postage account for the year 1805 amounted to 455*l*. In the year 1806 (being the year before the Berlin decree) it amounted to 515*l*. and in the year 1807, to 640*l*. Now as the Berlin decree was supposed to put a stop to all neutral commerce between England and the Continent, and as this gentleman's postage is chiefly created by receiving remittances for goods arriving in the hostile countries, it was to be expected in consequence of that Berlin decree being executed so rigorously as the defenders of our orders contend, that Mr. Glennie's postage account would have suffered a serious defalcation. No such thing—on the contrary, in 1807, the year after this truthful and well-executed decree, he appears to have paid 640*l*. being about one-fourth more than he had paid the year before it was issued, and double the increase of his account in any former years.

"Those merchants, sir, act in some sort, as bankers on account of American concerns, answering drafts made on them in favour of our manufacturers. When there is any interruption in the trade with the Continent, of course Mr. Glennie and others scruple to honour those drafts on American account, unless they be safe in doing so by having funds in their own hands. It is therefore a test of the execution of the enemy's decrees to inquire how these gentlemen answered the drafts subsequently presented to them. Mr. Glennie states that subsequent to the issuing of the Berlin decree, he continued to

answer drafts on American account, although he had not the sums in his hands, trusting, not, as a speculative man, but with that sort of confidence belonging to a practical merchant—a confidence of whose practical nature he gave the best pledge by staking thousands of pounds daily upon it—trusting I say with this sort of confidence, that the Berlin decree was of no avail whatever against our trade. Had it been otherwise he would have altered his line of conduct in the same manner as I shall show you he afterwards did when you issued your famous orders in council.

“The only other symptom, with which I shall trouble you, of the non-execution of this Berlin decree, is derived from the criterion of insurance; the house will perceive that questions were put to Mr. Martin with a view to bring to a determination, this point respecting the rate of insurance. He was asked, whether, in his knowledge and in the course of his practice as a merchant, shipping to America and chartering and insuring vessels, he had found that the rate of insurance rose after the Berlin decree, upon voyages in American ships from this country to America and back again; and this question was put to him because it was said that a rise from two to three guineas, or one half, had taken place upon this voyage—as if the power of the French navy was so considerable in the Atlantic, that it could make a difference of fifty per cent. in the rate of insurance against French cruisers, employed in executing the Berlin decree—as if the bare promulgation of that decree had at once swept the sea clean of our ships, and given over into the enemy’s hands, all the neutral trade that remained. Mr. Martin, as well as all the other witnesses, stated, that there is a rise every winter in consequence of sea risque, the summer rate being from two to two and a half, and that of the winter from three to three and a half per cent. But was there an additional or extraordinary rise in the year after the Berlin decree—in the year 1807? Mr. Martin says that there was not; but that the premiums were much the same as in 1806, that is, the summer two and a half, and the winter three and sometimes four guineas premium.

“The news of the Berlin decree reached Liverpool on the 11th of December 1806, and on the 13th of that month Mr. Martin had occasion to effect an insurance on American risque: it was from America to Liverpool, and was done at three guineas per cent.—Then had the *Berlin decree* raised the insurance? So far from it the premium on the very same voyage, as appears from the evidence, was exactly the sum of three guineas per cent. in the year before. Upon being further questioned whether any rise did at all take place, he says, some little rise was occasioned at first, after the knowledge of the Berlin decree came to Liverpool; but that was a temporary effect: thus he believed the premium would have been five guineas per cent. upon the same voyage outwards, but on the 13th of February the insurance was effected upon the same vessels at three guineas per cent. being the common winter premium.

“I am entitled here to dismiss the subject of the Berlin and other decrees with this one remark, that there is not only no evidence of those measures having been enforced, but every argument and fact against the power of the enemy to urge them in some respects, and in others to show that he had no desire to do so. The evidence of former decrees never having been executed, is entirely of the same sort, and our past experience affords us every argument to show that they were incapable of execution. Our experience, I say, affords us evidence that neutrals will of themselves continue to evade those decrees as long as you yourselves facilitate that evasion. From the facts produced by the testimony of the witnesses who have been examined and *cross-examined*, a consistent statement is made out, that those new decrees of the enemy have been nothing but as so much waste paper; in other words that they are a repetition of the ancient, unprofitable, and rapid gasconade of the French government. It shows us that these decrees had not and could not have had any effect, but to evince to the world that Bonaparte had some desires which he could not gratify; one scheme, at least, which he could not compass—and that with respect to this country, they were of no strength or avail whatever, until we ourselves

lent our aid to them by our own vigorous measures.

"I now come, sir, to the fatal part of the case set forth in the petitions now upon your table. I think I can prove, sir, that we ourselves, blinded and alarmed by the empty menaces of the enemy, which we had often before experienced to be ineffectual, terrified by vain fears which we could not describe, and arguing from the very uncertainty of the darkness in which we were, that some evil was impending, we knew not what, countersigned all the decrees of the enemy—backed their futile threats with our real and solid orders—carried them triumphantly into execution by our all powerful navy—and reduced the commerce of the country to that state, to that pitch of degradation, to which, he, our inveterate enemy had wished, but in vain wished, by those decrees to reduce it, and to which by no other earthly power but our own could he have succeeded in bringing it. Sir, I am now to call the attention of the house to the orders in council that have been lately issued by the present government, as they affect the foreign trade of this country; and I have to lament exceedingly upon the part of the petitioners, to whom the truth of the statement I am about to make is a matter of most serious concern indeed, that you are now to contemplate the very reverse of the picture which I have hitherto brought before you. You have seen that attempts have frequently been made by the enemy to ruin our trade, but that they always proved abortive. You are now to exchange that for another prospect, and view the attacks made upon our commerce by our own force and by our own wisdom—that force, and that wisdom, which had in every former instance succeeded in frustrating all invasions of our country—repelling all attacks upon our trade—turning the commerce of neutrals into the channels most beneficial to our interests—and converting to our own purposes, the very bitterest decrees of the French themselves. You will find that in every quarter we have, by our orders in council, been crossing and striking in with the enemy's plans, and supplying those deficiencies in their orders, which they in vain at-

tempted to make up. You will see too what the result has been—that the commerce of this once flourishing country is now brought down to a state lower than it ever was expected to reach, even by the most gloomy prophets, in the worst times of our history."

The great importance of the American trade to these countries, is thus brought forward by our able advocate: a trade not lightly to be given up to please the whims of our speculative statesmen. America has rendered herself independent of us in government, and if the present system of aggression towards her be continued, she will probably be independent of us in commerce at no very distant period. It is clearly proved, that the trade of America with the continent of Europe is even necessary to Great Britain for opening a channel for paying the balance due to our merchants.

"Let me here refer the house to the general testimony of all the witnesses engaged in the American trade, for a knowledge of the particular course of commerce, which we carry on with America by means of the continent. The manufactures of this country being bought up by the merchants, (in some few instances they are exported by the manufacturers themselves) are sent over to America, at two seasons in the year, in what are called by all the witnesses, the *spring* and *fall* shipments. I shall not attend to the latter, but shall take the instances of the spring shipments, in order to elucidate this subject. The orders for these are begun to be received and executed pretty early in the month of November. In December, and part of January, the transmission and preparation of the orders proceeds, and before the end of the month of January, each year, the orders for the spring shipments may be said to be almost completed. Sometimes, indeed, they encroach a little upon the month of February, but substantially you may take it, as proved by all the witnesses, that the orders are wholly received before the middle of the month of January. The goods that are thus sent to America, are chiefly manufactures peculiar to this country; for example these of Man-

chester, which indeed are shipped by no set of men to a greater extent, than by the Petitioners now at your bar. The payment of the goods thus sent over is made in a comparatively small proportion in American produce, chiefly cotton and tobacco, shipped directly from America to this country. This proportion amounts in general to about one part in three, which I will show, if the house will favour me with its attention, when I state for one year the course of American trade with the British empire; for that will be a more satisfactory argument, and go a greater way in demonstrating the necessity of the continuance of such a trade, than if I were to attempt describing it in any other manner.

"In 1804, according to the official accounts printed in America, by order of the houses of Congress, there were shipped from America to England, or I should rather say to the British dominions in Europe, American produce, to the amount of nearly three millions sterling, viz. 2,971,462*l.* reckoning dollars at the usual rate of 4*s.* 6*d.* sterling. From the same part of our dominions there appear to have gone over to America, in that year, goods to the amount of 6,213,645*l.* The exports from America to the British East Indies amounted in the same year to 29,500*l.* and the imports to America from thence amounted to nearly one million sterling, being 979,488*l.* The exports from the United States to the British settlements in North America amounted to 253,627*l.* and the imports from the latter to 178,135*l.* This balance, however, in favour of America on the trade with our Northern colonies, is only an apparent one. The sums which I have read are taken from the duties on importation; and *Plaster of Paris*, the chief article brought into the United States from our settlements, being absolutely necessary to the American farmer in the cultivation of his land, is not taxed, and of course is omitted in the estimate. It amounts to greatly more than the rest of the imports from Canada, &c. and leaves the balance here, as in general, against America. The exports to the British West Indies, during the same year, amounted to 1,585,722*l.* and the imports from thence in return were 1,066,316*l.* On this

head then there appears to be a balance to a considerable amount in favour of the United States. But from this must be deducted the real balance on the New Brunswick trade, at whatever it may be estimated, and even admitting the full balance as now stated, of nearly half a million on the West Indian branch of the account, the whole trade between America and our dominions gives a large excess of imports from us, over what we take in return. For even on this view of the account, the total amount of the exports from America to the British empire, in the year 1804, will be 4,840,058*l.* and the amount of the imports into the United States from the British empire, 8,437,984*l.* being about double the former sum. This great balance is moreover rapidly increasing; for, by taking the average of the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, we find that the excess of imports above exports was only three millions instead of four millions and a half, to which it had risen in 1804.

"The accounts, sir, on the table of this house confirm these statements taken from the American official documents. I hold in my hand a paper ordered to be printed on the 15th of March, and giving the value of imports from the United States, and exports thither, for the years 1805, 1806, and 1807. It appears from this document, that in 1806, the imports from America to Great Britain amounted to 4,360,743*l.* real value, and that the exports from Great Britain to the United States, in the same year, amounted to 12,865,551*l.*

"If we take the average of those three years I have mentioned, viz. 1805, 1806, and 1807, we find the exports to the United States of America amount to upwards of twelve millions sterling, and the average of imports to upwards of four millions and a half; and as the disproportion is increasing, we may say in general, that this country now exports to America three times as much as she imports from thence.

"Are you willing to continue exporting to America, twelve millions and a half of British produce and manufacture, or are you not?—If you are, how are you to be paid for it? It is evident, that you only receive four mil-

lions direct from America; therefore there are no less than eight millions wanting. And America, we all know, can only pay you by trading with the continent. If you wish to cut up that trade by the roots, you commit that old solecism of power, as my Lord Bacon so well calls it;—you wish to command the end, but you refuse to submit to the means. You desire to trade with the United States of America; but you desire, at the same time, to lop off their trade with the enemy, as you call it, which is in other words lopping off the very commerce which you carry on with your enemy, in spite of the war, and in spite of himself—by which you were getting eight millions sterling each year—by which you were enabled to continue a trading nation. You are destroying the only means by which America can pay that enormous amount to you. She must have the opportunity, not only of taking your goods, but of exporting her own, in order to pay you. She must not only export her own goods, she must also re-export yours with them, in order that you may still send them to your enemy, notwithstanding the hostilities you are engaged in—notwithstanding the decrees he is threatening your trade with. So stands the matter in argument, or if you will in theory, and I now invite this house to say, whether it is possible for them to conceive any thing more precise and conclusive than the evidence which has been adduced at your bar, to show that this is also the matter of fact, from the actual history of our trade with America.

“The witnesses most largely engaged in this commerce told you repeatedly (and it was so uniformly stated by each of them, in answer to the same question, that it is unnecessary for me to quote from the testimony of them all) they all concurred in telling you that they received remittances in payment of goods sent to America, from merchants acting as bankers for Americans in this country. Beside this, we have called those bankers to your bar, and have asked them how they came to be possessed of their remittances. They have told you that they have two ways of receiving the funds drawn upon by our manufac-

turers; that they get part, and but a small part, in goods, directly from the United States, and another part, which is by far the greatest part, in remittances from Europe, by bills arising from the sale of American produce on the continent, made payable to manufacturers and exporters of manufactured goods here. Mr. Bell has stated these remittances as forming two parts in three of the whole account. Mr. Glennie has told you that they are ten times more than he receives in the direct way from America; and Mr. Mann states them at three parts in five. They have said, that with these funds they answer bills drawn in favour of the manufacturers in this country, and at other times balance accounts with the United States. And being asked whether they only accepted those bills in consequence of the remittances in their hands—they said they freely accepted such bills, trusting to the continuance of the trade by which they had formerly received payment; and for the majority of their correspondents, they always accepted bills, whether they had goods already in their hands or not, when they knew consignments continued to be made as before to the continent.

“Now, sir, apply to the English decrees, those test—the amount of remittances, and the willingness of merchants to accept bills, which you have already applied to the execution of the Berlin decree, and then tell me what you think is the effect of the orders in council upon our foreign trade. You will find it the very contrary of that which might have been expected by the sanguine projectors of the new system. Applicable to this subject, you will find among others the very distinct testimony of Mr. Glennie. This gentleman told you, as I formerly observed, that the year after the Berlin decree, so far from having received less from the continent on American account, he had received one-fifth more than in any former year. How much then did he receive since the orders in council? Compare the months January and February, 1807, with the same months in 1808, and this will be the test of the effect of the orders in council upon his trade. He answers,

that in the months of January and February 1807, the amount of the remittances he received was about 103,000*l.* In consequence of those boasted measures of wisdom and vigour which were to bring all the trade of America with the Continent through our ports, one would suppose he should have received 200,000*l.* in the same period of the subsequent year—No such thing.—He received only 34,000*l.* Does he expect even this pittance in the next two months?—Far from it. He tells you this is the last he shall receive; it is the arrears or balance of the former accounts, and no new one can be opened.—Such then is the effect of the orders in council upon Mr. Glennie's traffic; he received instead of 103,000*l.* the sum of 34,000*l.* and in the next two months he cannot receive a shilling.

In every cross question that was put to him, he not only adhered to the statement which he had made, but put it in a stronger and stronger light, if possible, as he proceeded.—This plain fact, made out by his testimony, as well as that of all the other witnesses called to your bar, evinces to demonstration, that while the orders in council continue, you must continue to be cut off from receiving remittances, and that you are consequently with your own right-hand, cutting off, by two-thirds, your vast traffic with America.

“Having stated the substance of Mr. Glennie's evidence, it would be in vain to go through that of the other witnesses. It was proved that bills were refused on account of the want of remittances. The particulars of those bills, and the sums for which they were drawn, were stated at

your bar. In this unprecedented state of things, an unheard of practice appears to have crept into the course of commercial transactions. The statement of insolvency or no funds, is the usual ground of protesting or refusing bills; but the reason in this case is, not that the drawers are insolvent; not that they have any fears of the insolvency of the drawers, for they had an entire confidence in the solvency of their correspondents:—but that they had no funds in their hands, and expected to get none; and knowing well the cause of all this, they wrote down, on the protest, that they could not accept these bills *because of the orders in council*!”

We have entered into this subject at considerable length, from a sense of its importance. We wish our readers to become acquainted with it, and we think to give a full detail of this speech, and copious extracts from it, is the best mode of putting them into possession of this measure of state-policy, to which we have so often alluded in the Commercial Reports, and to which we fear increasing distress, arising from its pernicious effects, will force us to recur in our future numbers.

In our next we design to continue this article with further extracts from the important documents furnished by this speech. The present apparent relaxation on the part of America with respect to the embargo, does not appear likely to produce any change ultimately beneficial to this country, unless a spirit of conciliation influences our councils at home, an event we ardently desire, but of which we entertain great fears. h.

To be continued.

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